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EDITOR'S NOTE 
CITING FOREIGN LAW IN U.S. COURTS: 
IS OUR SOVEREIGNTY REALLY AT STAKE? 
The Honorable Peter J. Messitte has served on the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland since 1993, when President 
Clinton appointed him to the position. Judge Messitte received his 
bachelor's degree cum laude from Amherst College in 1963 and went 
on to receive his law degree from the University of Chicago Law 
School in 1966. Interestingly, Judge Messitte did not enter the prac-
tice of law after graduation, but instead joined the Peace Corps as a 
volunteer in Sao Paulo, Brazil. Mter returning from Brazil, Judge 
Messitte worked in private practice for fourteen years. In 1985, he 
joined the Montgomery County Circuit Court as an Associate Judge. 
While in this position, Judge Messitte established Maryland's first di-
vorce roundtable, in which lawyers, social workers, and psychiatrists 
discussed issues concerning the effects of divorce. 
Judge Messitte's work also extends to helping developing countries 
establish independent judicial systems. From 1997 to 2003, Judge 
Messitte was a member of the International Judicial Relations Com-
mittee of the Judicial Conference of the United States. In this Com-
mittee, Judge Messitte chaired the Working Group for Latin America 
and the Caribbean. He has also acted as a consultant for judicial re-
form projects in Mrica and Turkey. The following is a speech Judge 
Messitte presented on the influence of the U.S. Constitution in other 
countries and the relevance of foreign law in interpreting the Consti-
tution. This speech was part of the University of Baltimore's Constitu-
tion Day celebration on September 20, 2005. 
CITING FOREIGN LAW IN U.S. COURTS: 
IS OUR SOVEREIGNTY REALLY AT STAKE? 
The Honorable Peter J. Messitte 
Judge, United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland 
September 20, 2005 
Dean Holmes, Professor Higgenbotham, Members of the Faculty 
and Students of the University of Baltimore Law School, Ladies and 
Gentlemen: 
I'm honored to have been asked to speak to you on Constitution 
Day. There are so many things one could say about the remarkable 
document that is our Great Charter. But over the last several years I 
have had a special opportunity to consider the influence of our Con-
stitution abroad-its internationalization, so to speak-and in the 
time allotted to me this evening, I'd like to share with you some of my 
perspectives in that regard. I want to start by telling you a story, prob-
ably apocryphal, but one which illustrates rather well the tension in 
this area. 
Some years ago, the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln was cruis-
ing in the North Atlantic when it received a radio signal from the 
Canadians telling the Americans to divert their course 15 degrees 
south to avoid a collision. The Americans responded: "We suggest 
you divert your course 15 degrees north to avoid collision." The 
Canadians responded: "Repeat. Divert your course 15 degrees south." 
The Americans replied: "We insist you divert." Another round of this 
and finally the Americans responded: "We are the USS Abraham Lin-
coln, the second largest aircraft carrier in the U.S. Navy. We are ac-
companied by two destroyers and three submarines. We insist you 
divert your course or we will be required to take appropriate action." 
To which the Canadians replied: 
''Your call. 
We are a lighthouse." 
Hold that thought, as they say. I'll come back to it several minutes 
from now. 
Let us return to the Constitution. 
Can there be any doubt, as Professor Albert P. Blaustein once wrote, 
that our Constitution is "[America's] most important export?"I 
1. Albert P. Blaustein, The United States Constitution: A Model in Nation-Building, 
54 PHI KAPPA PHI FORUM 4, 14 (1984). 
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Virtually from its beginning more than 200 years ago, our Constitu-
tion had influence beyond our borders-in France, then throughout 
Europe-in Poland, Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Portugal-and in Latin America. These countries were at-
tracted not only by the idea of constitutionalism, but by the concepts 
of federalism, separation of powers, judicial review, and the recogni-
tion and protection of fundamental rights. We were not even doing 
much "exporting" in the early days. People came to our shores to 
observe and analyze what we had accomplished. De Tocqueville's De-
mocracy in America, based on his study and travel here, put in bold 
relief our constitutional institutions, especially federalism and judicial 
review. 
During the 19th century, countries, such as Argentina, copied our 
institutions almost down to the letter. Argentina's Corte Suprema de 
Justicia de la Naci6n was fashioned nearly identically after our own 
Supreme Court, with nine justices, the power of judicial review and a 
provision for discretionary review akin to our notion of certiorari. 
Our Constitution was also enormously influential in shaping govern-
mental structures in the wake of the Revolutions of 1848 in Europe. 
In time, of course, we did become active exporters of the Constitu-
tion. Mter the Spanish-American War, the U.S. exercised sovereign 
authority in the Philippines and many of our constitutional concepts 
were implanted there. By World War I, Woodrow Wilson spoke of 
making the world "safe for democracy." And aJustice of the Constitu-
tional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany has written that: "At 
no time since 1848 was political and legal thought in Germany more 
intensely preoccupied with American thought than after World 
War II. This is particularly true with regard to American 
constitutionalism."2 
In occupied Japan after World War II, the American approach to 
constitutionalism (especially federalism, judicial review and the pro-
tection of fundamental rights) had a similarly decisive influence. 
American concepts of rights, more particularly the Bill of Rights, 
have also had a profound impact upon international organizations. It 
was largely at the insistence of the United States that the framers of 
the U.N. Charter in San Francisco in 1945 included references to 
human rights, and Eleanor Roosevelt, it will be recalled, chaired the 
Commission that helped draft the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. India looked to American constitutional concepts as it 
emerged as an independent nation. 
In our own time, American assistance to the development of democ-
racies and the drafting of constitutions has been extraordinarily ex-
2. Helmut Steinberger, American Constitutionalism and German Constitutional De-
velopment, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 199, 212 (Louis Henkin & Albert]. 
Rosenthal eds., 1990). 
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tensive-in post-communist countries, as well as in countries that have 
emerged from dictatorships, especially in Latin America and Mrica. 
Many of you have no doubt heard of the American Bar Association's 
Central and Eastern European Law Initiative (CEELI), sponsored by 
the U.S. Agency for International Development, through which 
professors, lawyers, and judges spend considerable time engaged as 
constitutional consultants in that part of the world. In the last twelve 
months, I myself have been invited to Argentina and Peru to discuss 
how the concept of certiorari works in our Supreme Court. 
And continuously through all of this-as well might be expected-
the high courts of virtually of all these countries and more recently 
regional tribunals such as the European and Inter-American Courts of 
Human Rights-have with profound respect, quoted from the deci-
sions of our Supreme Court. This has especially been true as these 
courts have had to interpret norms derived from our Bill of Rights, 
principally in four areas: procedural justice and due process of law; 
equal treatment under the law; freedom of expression; and the right 
to privacy. One brief example will suffice. In 1993, a Kurdish union 
leader, Munir Ceylan, was sentenced to prison in Turkey for writing a 
newspaper article urging political action against the Turkish govern-
ment's policies concerning the Kurdish people. In 2000, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights found Ceylan's punishment to be a 
violation of human rights, and in so doing, the court quoted the 
words of someone it called "one of the mightiest constitutional jurists 
of all time," Oliver Wendell Holmes. The European court, in fact, 
cited several U.S. Supreme Court cases, including Brandenburg v. 
Ohio,3 which is so much in our own news today. 
All of this is by way of background-ironic background, I should 
say-to a circumstance that has generated a great deal of heat (and 
less light) in recent times-the citation of foreign sources by certain 
members of the Supreme Court as an aid to interpreting our own 
Constitution-especially when it comes to interpreting questions of 
fundamental liberties, given, as Jeffrey Toobin noted in a very recent 
edition of the New Yorker, that countries abroad sometimes "tend to be 
more progressive than those at home."4 
You would think that this would be a straightforward, innocent, not 
particularly complex debate, touching upon such issues as: 
1) The extent to which foreign law sources should be cited in 
our constitutional cases. 
2) What is meant by foreign law? And whose law? England's? 
The European Court of Human Rights's? Zimbabwe's (Don't 
laugh)? 
3. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
4. Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law 
Could Change the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42. 
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3) If foreign law is to be cited, for what purpose? For persuasive 
effect only? For precedential value, even if limited? 
In January of this year, Justices Breyer and Scalia held a debate at 
Washington College of Law, American University, that was broadcast 
over C-SPAN. It was a civil debate. Maybe a bit too much laughter by 
both and a bit too much interrupting by Justice Scalia. But basically a 
civil debate. 
But the debate has not been as straightforward, simple, and inno-
cent as you might expect. 
In May of 2004, the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the 
House Judiciary Committee passed a nonbinding resolution, Number 
568, sponsored by Congressmen Feeney and Goodlatte and 59 Repub-
lican co-sponsors, which was entitled the "Reaffirmation of American 
Independence Resolution."5 Let me read it to you: 
RESOLUTION 
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that 
judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of 
the United States should not be based on judgments, laws, or 
pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign 
judgments, laws, or pronouncements inform an understand-
ing of the original meaning of the laws of the United States. 
Whereas the Declaration of Independence announced that 
one of the chief causes of the American Revolution was that 
King George had "combined to subject us to a jurisdiction 
foreign to our constitution and unacknowledged by our 
laws;" 
Whereas the Supreme Court has recently relied on the judg-
ments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions to 
support its interpretations of the laws of the United States, 
most recently in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2474 
(2003); 
Whereas the Supreme Court has stated previously in Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n. 11 (1997), that "We think 
such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of inter-
preting a constitution ... ;" 
Whereas Americans' ability to live their lives within clear le-
gal boundaries is the foundation of the rule of law, and es-
sential to freedom; 
Whereas it is the appropriate judicial role to faithfully inter-
pret the expression of the popular will through laws enacted 
5. H.R. Res. 568, 108th Congo (2004). 
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by duly elected representatives of the American people and 
our system of checks and balances; 
Whereas Americans should not have to look for guidance on 
how to live their lives from the often contradictory decisions 
of any of hundreds of other foreign organizations; and 
Whereas inappropriate judicial reliance on foreign judg-
ments, laws, or pronouncements threatens the sovereignty of 
the United States, the separation of powers and the Presi-
dent's and the Senate's treaty-making authority: Now, there-
fore, be it 
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives 
that judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the 
laws of the United States should not be based in whole or in 
part on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign insti-
tutions unless such foreign judgments, laws, or pronounce-
ments are incorporated into the legislative history of laws 
passed by the elected legislative branches of the United 
States or otherwise inform an understanding of the original 
meaning of the laws of the United States.6 
175 
Congressman Feeney offered these remarks at the hearing that led 
to the resolution: 
Increasingly Federal Judges, including six U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices, have expressed disappointment in the Consti-
tution we inherited from the framers, and disdain for certain 
laws enacted by democratically elected Representatives. 
With disturbing frequency, they have simply imported law 
from foreign jurisdictions, looking for more agreeable laws 
or judgments in the approximately 191 recognized countries 
in the world. They champion this practice and fancy them-
selves players on the international scene of jurisprudential 
thought. In their recent speeches, several Justices have re-
ferred to the "globalization of human rights" and assuming a 
"comparative analysis" when interpreting our constitution. 
Is this a proper role for our United States judges?' 
Congressman Feeney also had this to say on MSNBC: "This resolu-
tion advises the courts that it is improper for them to substitute for-
eign law for American law or the American Constitution. To the 
extent they deliberately ignore Congress's admonishment, they are no 
longer engaging in good behavior within the meaning of the Constitu-
6. Id. 
7. The Courts and International Law: Hearing on Markup of H.R Res. 568 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Tudiciary, 108th Congo 
(2004), available at http://www.house.gov/feeney/rlown!oads/reaffirm/tf 
statementmarkup5-13-4 (statement of Rep. Feeney, Member, House 
Comm. on the Judiciary). 
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tion and may subject themselves to the ultimate remedy, which would 
be impeachment."s 
A resolution identical to Resolution 568-Resolution 97-was intro-
duced by Congressman Feeney on February 15, 2005, with approxi-
mately the same number of co-sponsors, and is currently pending 
before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution.9 Con-
gressman Poe of Texas, a former trial judge and instructor in constitu-
tional law and a supporter of the new resolution, had this to say: 
Using foreign court decisions across the board would create, 
of course, judicial chaos, judicial anarchy. But yet the Su-
preme Court does exactly this. Why should the Supreme 
Court be left to its own devices? If there is any other stan-
dard other than the Constitution, th[e]n what is next? 
Mr. Speaker, looking to foreign court decisions is as relevant 
as using the writings in "Reader's Digest," a Sears and Roe-
buck catalogue, a horoscope, my grandmother's recipe for 
the common cold, looking at tea leaves, star gazing, or the 
local gossip at the barber shop in Cut N' Shoot, Texas. Mr. 
Speaker, has the Supreme Court lost its way?lO 
And Congressman Sensenbrenner, Chair of the full House Judiciary 
Committee, in a very recent speech at Stanford University, said this 
about courts citing foreign sources of authority in their rulings: 
As I touched upon in the speech before the Judicial Confer-
ence last March, America's sovereignty and the integrity of 
our legal process are threatened by a jurisprudence predi-
cated upon laws and judicial decisions alien to our Constitu-
tion and foreign to our system of self-government. 
Federal courts have increasingly utilized foreign sources of 
law, as well as international opinion to interpret the United 
States Constitution. If this trend takes root in our legal cul-
ture, Americans might be governed "by laws of other nations 
or international bodies that Congress and the President have 
expressly rejected. Inappropriate judicial adherence to for-
eign laws and tribunals threatens American sovereignty, un-
settles the separation of powers, presidential and Senate 
treaty-making authority, and undermines the legitimacy of 
the judicial process. 
* * * 
I am pleased to support as an original cosponsor a resolution 
that will receive Committee consideration in the coming 
8. Tom Curry, A Flap Over Foreig;n Matter at the Supreme Court, MSNBC, Mar. 11, 
2004, available at http://www.house.gov /feeney /msnbcresolutionarticle. 
htm. 
9. H.R. Res. 97, I09th Congo (2005). 
10. Representative Ted Poe, Has the Supreme Court Lost its Way?, speech from the 
House Floor Uune 13, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/poe/re-
marks/ supremecourt6I305.htm. 
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months. This resolution reasserts the primacy of the United 
States, reaffirms the principles that informed America's Dec-
laration of Independence, and safeguards the sovereignty for 
which America's Founding generation and those who have 
followed have fought and died.u 
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What are we talking about here? Apart from citing relevant public 
international law (or private international) in a given case, we're talk-
ing about certain justices citing foreign law for its persuasive value-
never for its binding effect-in a very limited way in a handful of Su-
preme Court cases, although-to be sure-some controversial ones. 
We're talking about Roper v. Simmons, which held that the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on 
offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were com-
mitted.12 We're talking about Lawrence v. Texas, which overturned 
state law making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage 
in certain intimate sexual contact;13 Atkins v. Virginia, that dealt with 
the execution of mentally retarded offenders;14 Grutter v. Bollinger, 
that concerned racial and ethnic diversity policies in higher educa-
tion;15 and Knight v. Florida, regarding excessive delay in execution. 16 
Let's look at these cases: 
4) In Roper, Justice Kennedy, writing for a majority of five, spent 
eighteen pages reviewing Supreme Court precedents and the 
practices of the various fifty States. In his last four pages, he also 
noted that since the case of Trop v. Dulles,17 the Court "ha[d] 
referred to the laws of other countries and to international au-
thorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual punish-
ments"'18 and observed that the U.S. was "the only country in 
the world that continue[d] to give official sanction to the juve-
nile death penalty."19 He went on to cite international authori-
ties, including a few conventions that the U.S. either never 
signed or signed with reservations.20 But, on behalf of the five 
Justices who signed on to his opinion,Justice Kennedy also said, 
"the opinion of the world community, while not controlling our 
11. Representative F.James Sensenbrenner,Jr., Zale Lecture in Public Policy at 
Stanford University (May 9, 2005), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
medial pdfs/ stanfordjudgesspeech pressversion505. pdf. 
12. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
13. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
14. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
15. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
16. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999). 
17. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
18. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198 (2005). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 1199. 
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outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation 
of our own conclusions."21 
Even Justice O'Connor, in dissent, said, 
[T]his Nation's evolving understanding of human dignity 
certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at 
odds with, the values in other countries. . . . At least, the 
existence of an international consensus of this nature can 
serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and gen-
uine American consensus. The instant case presents no such 
domestic consensus, however, and the recent emergence of 
an otherwise global consensus does not alter that basic fact. 22 
On the other hand,Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Thomas, said "the basic premise of the Court's argument-
that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world 
- ought to be rejected out of hand."23 
5) In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy, for the majority, in two short 
paragraphs out of a thirty page opinion, referred to the repeal of 
laws punishing homosexual conduct in Great Britain and the 
case of Dudgeon v. u.K., from the European Court of Human 
Rights, which held such laws invalid under the European Con-
vention on Human Rights.24 
Justice Scalia, in contrast, characterized this reference to foreign 
law as "meaningless dicta, dangerous dicta however," and spoke of the 
impropriety of imposing "foreign moods, fads or fashions on Ameri-
cans" -quoting Justice Thomas from an earlier case.25 
But it should be noted that the m<yority in Lawrence was writing pri-
marily to refute Chief Justice Burger who had said in Bowers v. Hard-
wicJi26 that bans on gay sex were "firmly rooted in Judea-Christian 
moral and ethical standards."27 Lawrence also suggested that Euro-
pean conceptions of "human freedom" could help shed light on our 
understanding of the concept in our own country.28 
6) In Atkins, in a footnote, along with references to organizations 
with germane expertise such as the American Psychological As-
sociation, and to widely diverse religious communities in the 
U.S.-Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist-and to polls 
among Americans, Justice Stevens for a majority of six, stated 
that "within the world community, the imposition of the death 
penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is 
21. Id. at 1200. 
22. Id. at 1215-16 (O·Connor.]., dissenting). 
23. Id. at 1226 (Scalia, J.. dissenting). 
24. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576. 
25. Id. at 598 (Scalia. J.. dissenting). 
26. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
27. Id. at 196. 
28. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-78. 
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overwhelmingly disapproved."29 There was also reference to an 
amicus brief that had been filed by the European Union.30 
Chief Justice Rehnquist found little support in precedent and the 
antithesis of federalism "to place weight on foreign laws .... "31 Justice 
Scalia took issue with the majority's reference to the "so-called world 
community" and other non-domestic legal sources saying it took the 
"Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate a 'national con-
sensus. . . .' "32 
But what had the majority done? Had it imported "foreign law?" 
Had it said anything like, "We're bound to follow it?" 
7) In Crutter, the only reference to foreign law was in a concurring 
opinion by Justice Ginsburg who, in a single paragraph, referred to 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, which had been ratified by the U.S. in 
1994, which she cited because it endorsed the principle that cer-
tain measures might be in favor of certain racial groups for the 
purpose of guaranteeing their rights.33 True, she also cited as in 
accord the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, adopted by 170 nations,34 but 
not by the U.S. 35 
But why did she cite it? Simply to agree with the majority opinion 
that "race-conscious programs 'must have a logical endpoint.' "36 
8) Knight v. Florida was not a merits opinion. It was Justice Breyer 
dissenting from the denial of certiorari in a case raising the issue 
of excessive delay in executing an individual. He cited opinions 
from the Privy Council in England, from India, Canada, and 
from-in what he later called "a tactical error"-a case from 
Zimbabwe, which as he later conceded, is "not the human rights 
capital of the world." But all he said was that the opinions of 
these courts might be "useful." 
There have been other causes of concern to some Congressmen. 
They have cited speeches by such "transnationalist" justices as Jus-
tice O'Connor, who in Atlanta in October, 2003, said: 
29. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). 
32. Id. at 347 (Scalia, j., dissenting). 
33. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, j., concurring). 
34. United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (last visited 
March 10, 2006) (listing the states that have signed and ratified the Con-
vention). As of March 2, 2006, 182 countries are party to the Convention 
and the United States has still not ratified it. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
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I suspect that with time, we will rely increasingly on interna-
tional and foreign law in resolving what now appear to be 
domestic issues, as we both appreciate more fully the ways in 
which domestic issues have international dimension, and rec-
ognize the rich resources available to us in the decisions of 
foreign courts.37 
Of course Justice O'Connor also said (in a caveat not as frequently 
quoted) that: "[C]onclusions reached by other countries and by the 
international community, although not formally binding upon our de-
cisions, should at times constitute persuasive authority in American 
courts .... "38 
Justice Ginsburg has spoken to similar effect. 
Let's consider why some Congressmen, law professors, and com-
mentators object to when Justices cite foreign law. 
- It violates the doctrine of separation of powers, they say. 
Judges are supposed to interpret U.S. law and foreign law only 
insofar as the Constitution or statutory law allow. Congress, in 
contrast, may look to foreign law for whatever models it 
chooses. 
Citing foreign law undermines our distinctive Constitution, 
they argue. Foreign laws emerge from different historical, so-
cial, and cultural settings. 
They believe that citing foreign law is selective, i.e., Justices 
look almost always to Europe, sometimes Canada, and only as 
to rights the Justices favor (e.g., gay rights or abortion). There 
is no principled way to distinguish what law to cite for what 
purpose. 
Citing foreign law, they suggest, encourages judicial activism. 
Judges will find pretexts for abandoning existing precedents 
and launching in new directions. 
- Finally, citing foreign law undermines respect for law. The 
Constitution is "our" law. "[O]ver time ... [there's] a danger 
of dissolving the affections that Americans have for their own 
Constitution."39 (This is a thesis of Professor John McGinnis of 
Northwestern University Law School.) 
There are responses to these concerns, of course: 
37. Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, Remarks at the Southern Center for International Studies 
(Oct. 28, 2003), available at http://www.southerncenter.org/OConnor_ 
transcript. pdf. 
38. Id. 
39. Appropriate Rnle ofFMeignjudgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hear-
ing on H.R Res. 568 BefMe the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on 
the judiciary, 108th Congo (2004), available at http:/ / commdocs.house.gov / 
committees/judiciary/hju92673.000/hju92673_0.HTM (testimony of Pro-
fessor John McGinnis). 
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Leave aside concepts of international law relative to "war" or 
"treaties" or "conventions," which everyone agrees are relevant. 
- Leave aside cases interpreting Article I, Section 8, of the Con-
stitution, which authorizes Congress to define and punish of-
fenses against the law of nations (e.g., piracy). 
There are no other instances where Supreme Court Justices 
ever cited foreign law as binding upon them. 
- Citing foreign law for persuasive effect is no different from cit-
ing other persuasive authority, (e.g., lower federal court cases, 
state court cases, law review articles, even literary sources). 
The fact that foreign sources could be abused is not an argu-
ment that they should not be used at all, only that they must be 
used with integrity. 
- Reliance on foreign law is consistent with our earliest tradi-
tions. The Declaration of Independence, for example, says 
that "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that 
they should declare the causes which impel them to the separa-
tion,"40 and goes on to speak of "truths to be self-evident, that 
all men are created equal .... "41 Chief Justice John Marshall, 
in Thirty Hogsheads oj Sugar v. Boyle,42 wrote that "the decisions 
of the Courts of every country, so far as they are founded upon 
a law common to every country, will be received, not as author-
ity, but with respect."43 
- And there have been several other cases of similar tenor. 
- Foreign law can also be cited for its negative effect, as Justice 
Jackson, concurring, did in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer.44 President Truman had ordered the Secretary of Com-
merce to seize and operate steel mills.45 Justice Jackson cited 
the Weimar Constitution after World War I, which gave Ger-
many's President the right to suspend any and all rights when 
public safety and order might be endangered.46 When Hitler 
persuaded President Von Hindenberg to suspend all such 
rights, they were never restored.47 
- Telling judges how to interpret law also strikes "at the core of 
the judicial process." It isn't judges citing foreign law that vio-
lates the doctrine of separation of powers. It's telling judges 
they can't cite foreign law that violates the doctrine. 
- And one might add another argument: Resistance to citing 
foreign law is yet one more manifestation of the clash between 
40. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
41. Id. at para. 2. 
42. 13 U.S. (l Cranch) 191 (1815). 
43. Id. at 198. 
44. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
45. Id. at 582. 
46. Id. at 651 Uackson,j., concurring). 
47. Id. 
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strict constructionists, i.e., originalists (e.g., Justice Scalia and 
Justice Thomas, on the one hand, plus the some sixty House 
Republicans) and the non-originalists who see the Constitution 
as a living, constantly evolving document. If you look closely at 
the Resolution 568 and Resolution 97, you will see that they 
don't refer to citation of foreign law by the Supreme Court 
alone, but by judges in general; that the resolutions are not 
limited to constitutional interpretation but to ')udicial inter-
pretations regarding the laws of the United States;" and that 
they single out original intent as the only legitimate method of 
judicial interpretation. 
Opposition to citing foreign law, I submit, is not just wrong-headed. 
It looks very much like an effort at mind-control. It is simply one 
more shot across the bow at the Judiciary by Congress seeking to in-
trude on judicial independence. 
- Recall the Feeney Amendment (the same fellow behind Reso-
lution 97 and Resolution 568) that required federal judges to 
justify departures from the sentencing guidelines. That 
amendment passed with absolutely zero input (i.e., no testi-
mony) from the Judiciary. 
- Remember the subpoenaing of the sentencing records of a fed-
eral judge called to testify before Congress who had been criti-
cal of the sentencing guidelines. 
Recall the recurring threats to strip federal judges of authority 
to hear certain cases, (e.g., challenges to the phrase "Under 
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance; or to the display of the Ten 
Commandments on government property; and/or to the De-
fense of Marriage Act). 
- Recall the threats by Congress to withhold funds to enforce 
certain court decisions. 
- And consider the ominous reference by Congressman Sensen-
brenner of the House Judiciary Committee, in his recent Stan-
ford speech, to the possibility of Congress establishing an 
Inspector General for the federal courts. 
Opposition to citing foreign law, particularly insofar as it is a one-
way street (i.e., foreign courts can cite our Supreme Court, but ours 
cannot cite theirs), brings to mind other instances of America's arro-
gance and latter day rejection of multi-Iateralism. Some might say it's 
of a piece with the attitude of our current Government with respect 
to: 
- The Kyoto Accords (global warming); 
- The new Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; 
- The International Criminal Court; 
- And, yes, Iraq (where we're said to be engaged in an effort to 
democratize that country). 
So what, then, is the moral? 
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It is, I would suggest, that judges, lawyers, professors, and students 
of the law have to be vigilant. We must work to correct this short-
sightedness. We need to keep searching for truth wherever we can 
find it. We cannot, to paraphrase John Stuart Mill, rob the human 
race by ignoring whatever information and wisdom foreign law 
sources might hold. Of course we will never be bound by foreign law 
sources and no one has ever said we should be. But if reference to 
foreign sources is prohibited, posterity and the existing generation 
stand to lose, including those who don't want to consider those 
sources. If the foreign sources are enlightening, opponents will be 
deprived of the opportunity to learn. If foreign sources are not en-
lightening, opponents will be losing as great a benefit-"the clearer 
and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with 
error."48 
Let me return to my-what shall I call it? Parable? Of the USS 
Abraham Lincoln and the radio signal from the Canadians. If reason 
prevails, we can look forward to the day that most, if not all, of our 
fellow citizens understand that when our Supreme Court occasionally 
cites foreign law sources-that in fact it's a lighthouse out there-it's 
not a menacing vessel that's trying to interfere with our progress. And 
that lighthouse-containing all that foreign law-only exists to help 
illuminate us along our way. 
I'll close by quoting a statement made some years ago by someone 
who may surprise you: 
For nearly a century and a half, courts in the United States 
exercising the power of judicial review had no precedents to 
look to save their own, because our courts alone exercised 
this sort of authority. When many new constitutional courts 
were created after the Second World War, these courts natu-
rally looked to decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, among other sources, for developing their own law. 
But now that constitutional law is solidly ground in so many 
countries, it is time that the United States courts begin look-
ing to the decision of other constitutional courts to aid in 
their own deliberative process. The United States courts, 
and legal scholarship in our country generally, have been 
somewhat laggard in relying on comparative law and deci-
sions of other countries. But I predict that with so many 
thriving constitutional courts in the world today ... that ap-
proach will be changed in the future. 49 . 
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Who was the speaker? Our late Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist. 
He tried to pull back slightly in his later years. But he was clearly torn. 
So you see, there is reason to hope. 
